Privatizing Social Security by Laurence J. Kotlikoff
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Privatizing Social Security
Volume Author/Editor: Martin Feldstein, editor
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-24101-7
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/feld98-1
Publication Date: January 1998
Chapter Title: Simulating the Privatization of Social Security in General Equilibrium
Chapter Author: Laurence J. Kotlikoff
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6252
Chapter pages in book: (p. 265 - 311)7  Simulating the Privatization 
of  Social Security in 
General Equilibrium 
Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
The privatization of social security is one of the hottest policy issues currently 
under discussion in the United States. Much of this interest seems motivated by 
a desire to find a way out of the U.S. social security system’s long-run financing 
problem. But there is also a growing awareness among Americans of Chile’s 
success in privatizing social security and the fact that countries all over the 
world are trying to replicate it. Chile’s privatization coincided with the spectac- 
ular takeoff of its economy and has led some observers to suggest that priva- 
tizing social security was the key to Chile’s economic growth. The truth here 
is hard to know. The Chilean economy benefited from a number of concomitant 
economic reforms. It also benefited from a stable government and from im- 
provements in external economic conditions. Given the potential for exaggerat- 
ing the effect on Chile of privatizing social security, it is important to take 
a hard-nosed  look at what economic analysis tells us privatization can and 
cannot do. 
This paper does this. It draws and builds on Kotlikoff (1996a, 1996b, 1996c) 
in trying to identify the economic arguments for and against privatization. One 
of the main, although certainly not novel, points in these papers is that, absent 
Laurence J. Kotlikoff is professor of economics at Boston University and a research associate 
of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
The author thanks Martin Feldstein and Jan Walliser and other members of the NBER project 
on privatizing social security for very helpful comments. He also thanks Andrew Samwick for 
providing data and Jan Walliser for excellent research assistance. Part of this study relies on Kent 
Smetters’s, Jan  Walliser’s,  and my  modification of  the Auerbach-Kotlikoff  dynamic life-cycle 
model to incorporate multiple income groups. Support for Walliser’s work on this modification 
was provided by  the National Bureau of Economic Research. Support for Smetters’s work on the 
modification was provided by the Congressional Budget Office. The author is very grateful to both 
organizations for providing this assistance. 
265 266  Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
efficiency improvements, welfare improvements accruing to particular genera- 
tions as the result of  privatization  come at the expense of  welfare losses to 
other generations. Moreover, absent efficiency gains or intergenerational redis- 
tribution, making some members of a generation better off requires making 
other members worse off. Policy makers should, presumably, be interested in 
identifying and immediately enacting any reforms that constitute Pareto im- 
provements. Hence, understanding the potential pure efficiency gains from pri- 
vatization is important. But policy makers also routinely trade off the welfare 
of one generation against that of another. Consequently, they also need to un- 
derstand the potential role of  privatization  in redistributing resources across 
and within generations. 
This paper uses the Auerbach-Kotlikoff  (1987) dynamic fiscal policy model 
(the AK model) to simulate the macroeconomic and efficiency effects of priva- 
tization. Most of the results reported are based on the single-agent version of 
the model in which all cohort members are identical. But the final section of 
the paper reports some preliminary results based on a multiagent version of the 
model in which cohort members differ with respect to their earnings abilities. 
This new version of the AK model builds on the important work of Fullerton 
and Rogers (1993), which appears to represent the first serious attempt to in- 
corporate intragenerational heterogeneity in a life-cycle simulation model. 
This paper adds to a growing literature on the economics of privatizing so- 
cial security. Feldstein (1995) uses a partial equilibrium framework, and Arrau 
(1990) and Arrau and Schmidt-Hebbel (1993) use a version of the AK model 
to make a number of the points argued here. The AK model used by Arrau and 
Arrau and Schmidt Hebbel takes labor supply as exogenous. This is a signifi- 
cant shortcoming since the efficiency  gains from privatizing  social security 
arise, in large part, from eliminating social security’s distortion of labor supply 
decisions. Raffelhueschen  (1993) does include  variable  labor  supply in his 
simulation analysis of  privatizing  social security, and his qualitative conclu- 
sions  are  quite  similar to those  reached  here.  But  Raffelhueschen’s  model 
contains only two periods, which limits the  applicability of his quantitative 
findings.  Like  this  study,  Imrohoroglu,  Huang,  and  Sargent  (1995)  use  a 
multiperiod life-cycle model to simulate the effects of privatizing social secu- 
rity. Although their model is more elaborate than the one used here, it does not 
include variable labor supply, which precludes separating efficiency gains from 
intergenerational redistribution. Nonetheless, their general findings concerning 
noncompensated social security privatization transitions accord with those pre- 
sented here. 
The paper proceeds  in section 7.1 by  discussing the potential macroeco- 
nomic and efficiency effects of pay-as-you-go social security. Section 7.2 de- 
scribes the AK model and its parameterization for this study. Sections 7.3 and 
7.4 report results  for a one-income-class and multi-income-class versions of 
the AK model. The final section summarizes and concludes the paper. 267  Simulating the Privatization of  Social Security 
7.1  Social Security’s Privatization and the Macro Economy 
7.1.1  Social Security and Saving 
Most industrialized economies and a good many developing countries have 
spent the postwar period dramatically expanding their pay-as-you-go social 
security programs. Although this expansion has reduced poverty rates among 
the elderly, it has also redistributed tremendous sums from young and future 
generations, as a group, to contemporaneous older generations, as a group. 
The mechanism underlying the redistribution to the initial elderly is clear. 
Generations that are retired or close to retirement at the time pay-as-you-go 
social security benefits are increased receive windfalls. Initial young as well as 
all future generations are then left contributing to a retirement system whose 
rate of return is dictated by the total earnings of subsequent contributors and, 
thus, the economy’s rate of growth of labor earnings. In the United States, this 
growth rate appears to be about one-third the rate of  return available from 
investing in the market.’ 
This intergenerational redistribution, which produces a very big windfall for 
the initial elderly and imposes a smaller, but still substantial, loss on all subse- 
quent generations, has a major macroeconomic fallout. It raises the current 
consumption of the elderly by more than it reduces the current consumption of 
the current young as well as that of future generations, whose current consump- 
tion is obviously zero. Consequently, the policy lowers national saving. The 
consumption of  the elderly rises by  more than that of the young for two rea- 
sons. First, the elderly have higher propensities to consume out of remaining 
lifetime resources than do the young.2 Why? Because the elderly are closer to 
the ends of their lives and have, therefore, fewer years over which to spend each 
dollar of remaining lifetime resources. Second, as mentioned, the windfalls to 
the current elderly are paid for, not only by  the current young, but also by 
future generations. So the resource loss to the initial young is smaller than the 
resource gain to the initial elderly. 
Figure 7.1, based on data developed in Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and Sabelhaus 
(1996),  documents the difference by age in propensities to consume. It shows 
that propensities to consume of American cohorts are roughly constant through 
age sixty and then rise dramatically. Figures 7.2 and 7.3 use the same data to 
show how  relative age-consumption and age-resource profiles for American 
cohorts have changed since the early 1960s. Note that the very substantial in- 
I.  In a setting in which the growth rate of earnings as well as the market return on capital are 
risky, the comparison between the return paid by  social security and that paid by the market re- 
quires appropriately adjusting for risk. It seems unlikely, however, that such an adjustment would 
make pay-as-you-go social security a better investment than investing in the market. 
2.  The term resources refers to the present value of all remaining lifetime nonasset income (net 
of taxes and gross of transfer payments received) plus current net wealth. 0.25 
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Fig. 7.1  Average propensities to consume out of total resources (r = 6 percent) 
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Fig. 7.2  Relative consumption profiles 
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Fig. 7.3  Cohort resources per capita/per capita resources 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
crease in the resources of the elderly relative to the young has coincided with 
an equally substantial increase in their relative consumption. The secular in- 
crease in the relative resources of  the elderly reflects many factors. But the 
predominant factor is direct government redistribution to the elderly through 
social security, Medicare, and Medicaid. 
As figure 7.4 shows, U.S. intergenerational redistribution  has led to pre- 
cisely what the life-cycle model predicts-a  decline in the rate of U.S. saving. 
The greater than two-thirds decline in the rate of U.S. saving since the 1950s 
and 1960s has meant a much lower rate of U.S. domestic investment. This, in 
turn, has raised real interest rates and reduced labor productivity and real wage 
growth substantially below what would otherwise have been the case (see fig. 
7.5). Thus, these general equilibrium feedback effects have exacerbated the 
direct  redistribution  from young  and  future  generations  to  the  initial  old 
through pay-as-you-go social ~ecurity.~ 
The fiscal burdening of young and future generations through pay-as-you-go 
social security can occur just as well in settings with stable as well as unstable 
3.  For a simulation analysis showing how alternative government policies affect the welfare of 
current and future generations, see Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). 270  Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
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demographics. But a baby boom followed by a baby bust of  the kind being 
experienced by most developed economies places greater stress on the social 
security chain letter. Indeed, the United States, Japan, Germany, Italy, France, 
and a host of other countries now face the unpleasant prospect of either dramat- 
ically raising their payroll tax rates over the next few decades or dramatically 
reducing their social security benefits. It is this impending demographic/social 
security crunch, rather than a real appreciation of  the intrinsic problem with 
running unfunded social security programs, that seems to be leading politicians 
to consider privatizing social security. 
7.1.2  The Saving, Investment, and Growth Effects of Privatization 
If privatization ends up placing a larger fiscal burden on initial older genera- 
tions, it will lower the fiscal burden not only of the initial young but also of all 271  Simulating the Privatization of  Social Security 
future generations. In this case, the initial elderly, with their high propensities 
to consume, will reduce their consumption by more than the initial young will 
raise their consumption. Thus, the net effect will be a rise in national saving, 
investment, and, at least in the short run, real wage growth. 
The personal  security system described  in Kotlikoff (1996b) provides an 
example of how privatization may produce income effects that are conducive 
to more national saving. In this scheme, social security benefits are phased out 
over a forty-five-year period. Since payroll contributions to social security are 
immediately privatized (i.e., the contributions are made to and invested within 
private accounts), an alternative fiscal instrument is needed to finance social 
security benefits during the transition. The personal security system uses a con- 
sumption tax, specifically a federal retail sales tax, to pay for transitional bene- 
fits. Since the elderly account for a larger share of consumption than they do 
of social security payroll contributions, this policy imposes a larger fiscal bur- 
den on them. 
In addition to altering national saving via income effects, privatization may 
also change saving incentives in a way that either encourages or discourages 
current consumption. Suppose, for example, that income tax financing is used 
to pay for interest on debt issued in the course of privatizing social security. 
The higher effective rate of  capital income taxation that results from higher 
income tax rates raises the price of consuming in the future relative to the 
present and provides the young and old alike an incentive to substitute current 
for future consumption, that is, to save less.4  Indeed, such positive substitution 
effects on current consumption could outweigh the negative income effects on 
current consumption arising under particular privatization schemes, producing, 
on balance, a decline in national saving. 
Since the saving, investment, and growth effects of privatizing social secu- 
rity are theoretically ambiguous, depending on how privatization is achieved, 
simulation analysis is needed to understand the net macroeconomic effect of 
privatization. Before turning to such analysis, let us consider other issues in- 
volved in privatizing social security. 
7.1.3  Are There Efficiency Gains from Privatizing Social Security? 
Economic efficiency concerns the structure of economic incentives, such as 
the incentive to consume now rather than later or the incentive to work rather 
than enjoy leisure. Since privatization of  social security will generally alter 
economic incentives, the possibility arises that privatization could make the 
economy  more efficient-that  it could  improve the  structure of  incentives 
and, in the process, make some generations better off without making others 
worse off. 
The most important incentive affected by social security is the incentive to 
4. Changes in the relative of price of current and future consumption may also produce income 
effects, unless households are compensated for such relative price changes. 272  Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
work. By financing social security benefits via payroll taxation, social security 
reduces this incentive, although the degree to which it does so depends on the 
nature of its marginal linkage between social security benefits and contribu- 
tions. This linkage can be positive, negative, or zero. Zero linkage occurs when 
social security benefits are determined, at the margin, independent of contribu- 
tions or when  workers  incorrectly perceive  that contributing more to social 
security will not raise their future social security benefits. In the United States, 
misconception of the true nature of benefit-tax linkage seems plausible given 
the complex nature of the US.  social security benefit formula. 
In a “pay-as-you-go” system with zero actual or perceived linkage, workers 
will consider 100 percent of their payroll tax contribution to be a tax on their 
labor  supply. Nonetheless,  in  a pay-as-you-go  program  with stable growth, 
workers will, on average, receive some return on their contributions to social 
security-a  return that is governed by the rate of growth of the economy. So, 
on average, social security contributions are not just a tax. 
This point notwithstanding, there is no necessary relation between the aver- 
age and marginal returns to social security contributions. To see this, suppose 
the social security payroll tax rate is 15 percent. If benefits are provided as a 
lump sum independent of past contributions, the marginal return from an extra 
dollar of contributions is zero, and social security adds 15 percentage points 
to the total effective marginal tax rate on labor supply. If, on the other hand, 
the government were to provide, in present value, two dollars for every dollar 
contributed to social security above some contribution level, social security 
would represent a marginal subsidy to labor supply for all those contributing 
above that level. Such a subsidy would reduce the total effective marginal tax 
rate on labor supply by 15 percentage points. 
Although providing  100 percent or greater marginal benefit-tax linkage to 
some contributors is certainly feasible, providing such linkage to all contribu- 
tors may be politically impossible because of equity considerations. Ignoring 
other fiscal instruments, providing  such high marginal benefit-tax linkage on 
each dollar contributed to social security requires imposing a large inframar- 
ginal tax. Since this  large inframarginal tax would be independent of labor 
earnings, low-wage earners would face a higher average tax from social secu- 
rity than would high-wage earners, making the system regressive. 
7.1.4  The Potential Efficiency Gain from Eliminating the U.S. Social 
Security Payroll Tax 
The smaller is a social security system’s marginal benefit-tax linkage, the 
larger are the chances that privatizing social security can support an efficiency 
gain. To see this, consider a preprivatization  situation in which social security 
benefits are provided to workers independent of their past contributions; mar- 
ginal linkage is therefore zero, and workers view all their payroll tax contribu- 
tions as a marginal tax on their labor supply. Also assume that privatization is 
accomplished by paying only those social security benefits owed to existing 
retirees as well as those benefits that current workers have accrued as of  the 273  Simulating the Privatization of  Social Security 
date of the privatization. In this case, the payroll tax will, over time, disappear 
as a smaller and smaller number of original retirees and workers with accrued 
benefits remain alive. As the payroll tax rate falls, the total effective tax on 
labor supply will fall as well. Since the government’s distortion of labor supply 
is reduced over time, this method of privatizing social security has the potential 
of improving economic efficiency. 
Distortions of economic decisions rise with the square of the total effective 
marginal tax on the decision, so the contribution of the payroll tax to distorting 
labor supply depends on the size of marginal income taxes as well as other 
effective marginal labor taxes. In the United States, workers who earn less than 
social security’s covered earnings ceiling (currently $62,500) are subject to the 
full 15.3 percent marginal social security payroll tax.5 Most of these workers 
are likely to be in the 15 percent federal marginal income tax bracket. They 
are also likely to face a 5 percent state marginal income tax and state sales 
taxes as well as federal excise taxes, which together effectively tax their labor 
earnings at about 5 percent. 
In combination, these non-social  security marginal taxes total 25 percent. 
The 15.3 percent U.S.  social security payroll tax rate raises the total effective 
marginal tax rate on labor supply from 25 to 39 percent once one takes into 
account the fact that half the payroll tax contribution (the employer’s contribu- 
tion) can be deducted from the federal income tax. Now,  .25 squared equals 
.0625, and .39 squared equals .1521. Since the distortion of  labor supply is 
proportional to the square of the total effective marginal labor tax rate, the U.S. 
social security payroll tax  may  be  raising labor supply distortions of  low- 
income workers by  143 ([(.1521/.0621) - I])  X  100) percent even though 
it raises the total effective marginal labor tax rate by only 56 ([(.39/.25) - 11 
X  100) percent6 
7.1.5 
This analysis may overstate social security’s actual distortion of labor supply 
and the efficiency gains from privatization because of  marginal benefit-tax 
linkage under the current system. In the United States, marginal benefit-tax 
linkage varies enormously across the population. Many secondary earners in 
two-earner couples and all nonworking spouses in single-earner couples col- 
The Linkage at the Margin of Benefits to Earnings7 
5. The 15.3 payroll tax rate includes the Medicare (hospital insurance) tax. 
6. For low-income workers covered by the earned income tax credit, the payroll tax’s marginal 
distortion is even larger. Such workers lose twenty cents of their earned income tax credit for every 
dollar that they earn. Hence, their total effective marginal labor tax rate is 45 percent absent the 
social security payroll tax and 59 percent with the payroll tax. For such workers, the payroll tax 
raises their total effective marginal tax rate by 3  1 percent, but their labor supply distortion by  72 
percent. Compared to workers who face the earned income tax credit, the incremental distortion 
from the payroll tax (which is proportional to the difference between ,3481 and ,2025) is 62.5 
percent larger than the incremental distortion for workers who do not face the earned income tax 
credit (which is proportional to the difference between .1521 and ,0625). 
7.  This section draws on Kotlikoff (1996~). 274  Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
lect dependent retirement and survivor benefits based solely on their spouse’s 
earnings histories. Consequently, they receive zero additional benefits in ex- 
change for their marginal payroll tax contributions to social security.8  The same 
is true for workers under age twenty-two since their earnings are not included 
in the calculation of  average indexed monthly earnings for purposes of de- 
termining retirement benefits. On the other hand, benefit-tax linkage for many 
primary earners in two-earner couples is significant. 
Table 7.1 presents net marginal tax rates on social security contributions for 
six different household types taking into account benefit-tax  linkage. These 
data were provided by Andrew Samwick and are based on a benefit-calculating 
program developed in Feldstein and Samwick (1992).9 The calculations as- 
sume a 6 percent real rate of discount, a 1.2 percent rate of real wage growth, 
and a 3.5 percent rate of  inflation and consider the net rate of social security 
benefit  taxation  arising  from a permanent  increase in  monthly  earnings by 
$1  .00. The table considers only the old age and survivors (OASI) components 
of social security, and its net tax rates should be compared with the 11.2 per- 
cent OASI payroll tax. Negative values refer to subsidies. 
The table shows three things. First, it confirms that marginal OASI net tax 
rates differ greatly across different Americans. For example, at age fifty, the 
table’s low-earner,  single-earner husband  faces a  12 percent  social  security 
subsidy, whereas a high-earner (in the 15 percent benefit bracket), single male 
age fifty faces a 10 percent marginal tax. Second, OASI net tax rates decline, 
often substantially, over the life cycle. Consider again the low-earner, single- 
earner husband.  His net  tax rate falls from 2 to  -23  percent  between  ages 
twenty-five and sixty. The reason for the decline in net tax rates with age is 
that, the closer one gets to collecting marginal benefits arising from additional 
labor earnings, the less severe is the discounting of those benefits. 
Third, as one goes from low- to high-earner households who are earning 
less than social security’s covered earnings ceiling, net marginal tax rates rise 
substantially. For example, there is a 15 percentage point spread between the 
5 percent subsidy facing fifty-year-old, low-earning, single males and the 10 
percent  tax  facing  fifty-year-old,  high-earning,  single  males.  On  the  other 
hand, once one passes the covered earnings ceiling, the marginal OASI net tax 
drops to zero. Workers earning more than  social security’s covered earnings 
ceiling face zero marginal OASI payroll taxation and also receive no marginal 
social security benefits.’” 
Do workers whose benefits are linked at the margin to additional earnings 
8. This discussion abstracts from disability benefits. 
9. Boskin et al. (1987) is an earlier study of  the marginal net rate of  social security taxation 
that reaches similar conclusions. 
10. For this large group of workers, social security does, however, represent a substantial infra- 
marginal tax. Indeed, it is this large inframarginal tax on high earners that is used to provide low 
earners, as a group, with low or negative marginal OASI net tax rates and average rates of return 
on their contributions that exceed the economy’s growth rate. 275  Simulating the Privatization of  Social Security 
Table 7.1  Net Marginal OASI Tax Rate on $1.00 Rise in Monthly Wages (%) 
Case 
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understand the linkage? We do not know. However, we do know that correctly 
assessing the linkage is very difficult. Doing so requires knowledge of intricate 
OASI benefit provisions and the ability to make sophisticated actuarial calcula- 
tions.  Since very  few  workers  have  such knowledge  or an  actuarial back- 
ground, the vast majority are, presumably, guessing about the degree to which 
their benefits are linked at the margin to their additional earnings. If they are 
overassessing the degree of linkage, the present social security system may be 
less distortionary than it appears. On the other hand, if they are underassessing 
the degree of linkage, the opposite will be true. In this case, privatizing social 
security can be beneficial by simply making clear that the true rate of marginal 
taxation of labor supply is less than the perceived rate. 
7.1.6  Other Efficiency Issues Raised by Social Security’s Privatization 
In addition to its effect on effective marginal tax rates on labor supply, priva- 
tization may also alter other effective marginal tax rates. For example, if priva- 
tization is accomplished by using income tax financing to pay, over time, the 
accrued benefits owed to current retirees and workers, there will be a tempo- 
rary increase in effective marginal capital income taxation.  If effective mar- 
ginal capital income taxation is already quite high owing to, say, a high corpo- 
rate income tax, privatization  could well reduce economic efficiency. Thus, 
there is no guarantee that privatizing  social security will improve economic 
efficiency. It all depends on the type of social security system being privatized, 
the nature of  other fiscal distortions, and the manner in which privatization 
takes place. 276  Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
An entirely different efficiency issue raised by social security’s privatization 
is its effect on the availability to the elderly of longevity insurance (insurance 
against outliving one’s resources). Social security provides this insurance by 
paying retirees benefits for as long as they live. Social security overcomes the 
adverse selection problem faced by private insurers in trying to sell annuities 
by simply forcing everyone into its insurance pool; that is, it effectively forces 
everyone to buy its annuities. The government has a second important advan- 
tage vis-i-vis private insurers, namely, the ability to provide inflation-indexed 
benefits. The U.S. government appears poised to assist private insurers in sell- 
ing indexed annuities by following the example of England and several other 
countries in issuing indexed debt. Insurance companies will be able to pur- 
chase this debt to hedge their exposure in  selling indexed  annuities to the 
public. 
Research is now under way to assess the potential efficiency costs of elimi- 
nating the compulsory purchase of  annuities through  social security, which 
would potentially leave the elderly with much less longevity insurance. These 
costs may be  substantial because,  as demonstrated  in Kotlikoff and Spivak 
(1981), the value of longevity insurance can be very high even for households 
with  moderate  degrees of  risk  aversion. On the other hand,  Kotlikoff  and 
Spivak also show that extended families, for whom information problems are 
surely less severe, can insure their members against longevity risk to a surpris- 
ing degree. The fact, recently documented by Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoff 
(1996), that extended families do not self-insure does not preclude their choos- 
ing to do so in response to the privatization of social security. Anecdotal as 
well as hard evidence on extended family living arrangements suggests that 
self-insurance by extended families was much greater in the United States prior 
to the expansion of  social security. In any case, until this important issue is 
resolved, it will be impossible to assess the net efficiency gains from priva- 
tizing social security.’I 
7.2  Using the Auerbach-Kotlikoff Model to Study Social 
Security’s Privatization 
7.2.1  The Auerbach-Kotlikoff Model 
The Auerbach-Kotlikoff model (the AK model) can provide some sense of 
the potential saving, investment, and growth effects of privatizing social secu- 
rity.12 The AK model calculates the time path of all economic variables in its 
economy over a 150-year period. The model has fifty-five overlapping genera- 
l l. Note that, in a privatized system, the government could limit the degree of adverse selection 
by (a)  compelling each cohort to annuitize all its accumulated privatized account balances, say, at 
age sixty-five and (b)  prohibiting insurance companies from restricting the sale of  its annuities to 
individuals with particular characteristics. 
12.  For a detailed description of the AK model, see Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). 277  Simulating the Privatization of Social Security 
tions. Each adult agent in the model lives for fifty-five years (from age twenty 
to age seventy-five). 
There are three sectors: households, firms, and the government. Households 
(adult agents) decide how much to work and how much to save based on the 
after-tax wages and after-tax rates of return they can earn in the present and 
the future on their labor supply and saving, respectively. The work decision 
involves not only deciding how much to work in those years that one is working 
but also when to retire. The AK model’s time-separable, CES consumption and 
leisure preferences that underlie these decisions were chosen in light of evi- 
dence on actual labor supply and saving behavior. 
As agents age in the model, they experience a realistic profile of increases 
in wages. This age-wage profile is separate from the general level of wages, the 
time path of which is determined in solving the model. Fiscal policies affect 
households by altering their after-tax wages, their after-tax rates of return, and, 
in the case of consumption taxes, their after-tax prices of goods and services. 
The model is equipped to deal with income taxes, wage taxes, capital income 
taxes, and consumption taxes. It is also able to handle progressive as well as 
proportional tax rates. Finally, and most important for this study, the model 
includes a pay-as-you-go social security system in which the perceived linkage 
between taxes and benefits can be set at any desired value. 
The model’s base-case population growth rate is set at a constant 1 percent 
rate, with the population of each new cohort being 1 percent larger than that 
of the previous cohort. All agents are assumed to have the same preferences, so 
differences in behavior across agents arise solely from differences in economic 
opportunities. Until section 7.4, all agents within an age cohort are assumed to 
be identical; that is, differences in economic opportunities are present only 
across cohorts.  Section 7.4 considers a heterogeneous-agent  version of  the 
model, developed by Kent Smetters, Jan Walliser, and myself. This modified 
model considers twelve earnings groups within each cohort. Each earnings 
group experiences the same longitudinal growth in earnings but has a different 
level of earnings. This modified model facilitates the study of the effect of priva- 
tization on the intragenerational distribution of economic resources and welfare. 
The AK model’s output is produced by perfectly competitive firms that hire 
labor and capital to maximize their profits. These firms produce subject to a 
CES production function, which, for purposes of this study, is restricted to the 
Cobb-Douglas form. The government sector consists of a treasury that collects 
resources from the private sector to finance government consumption and an 
unfunded, “pay-as-you-go” social security system that levies payroll taxes to 
pay for contemporaneous retiree benefit payments. There is no money in the 
model and, thus, no monetary policy. There is, however, government debt, and 
the model can handle deficit-financed reductions in payroll and other taxes. It 
can also handle gradual phase-ins of one tax for the other. Finally, the model 
contains a lump sum redistribution authority (LSRA)-a  hypothetical govern- 
ment agency that can use lump sum taxes and transfers to redistribute among 278  Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
generations alive at a point in time as well as those who will be born in the 
future. The LSRA can be used (switched on) to study the pure economic effi- 
ciency effects of particular policy changes. 
Although the model handles a great number of complex processes, it leaves 
out certain portions of reality, some small and some large. For one thing, there 
are no liquidity constraints. Leaving out liquidity constraints greatly facilitates 
the  simulation of  social  security’s privatization.  The reason  is that  one can 
model the act of privatizing social security contributions as equivalent to sim- 
ply eliminating the payroll tax. This reflects the fact that agents in the model 
cannot be forced to save. Any attempt to do so simply leads them to borrow 
against their future wealth. This applies to forcing agents to invest their social 
security contributions in private accounts. Doing so would produce  the same 
net saving as not doing so. This said, it is worth pointing out that, in the particu- 
lar economies simulated here, agents do not actually seek to borrow. So, even 
if a liquidity constraint (specifically, a constraint against negative net wealth) 
were added to the model, it would not be binding. 
The version of the model used here ignores saving for purposes other than 
retirement, such as bequests. The model also ignores uncertainty with respect 
to either individual or macroeconomic outcomes. These and other omissions 
suggest viewing the model’s results cautiously. 
7.2.2  Modeling Social Security’s Privatization 
As just mentioned, in the AK model, privatizing  social security contribu- 
tions just requires setting the model’s social security payroll tax rate to zero.I3 
Hence, there is no need to add a formal private pension system to the model. 
Beyond eliminating the payroll tax, privatizing social security benefits within 
the model involves three key decisions: how fast to phase out benefits, whether 
to issue explicit government debt for a period of time to make up for some or 
all of the loss in payroll tax revenue, and what tax instrument to use, during 
the benefit phase-out period, to pay for benefits that are not financed by explicit 
borrowing and to meet, during and after the benefit phase-out period, interest 
on new debt issued as part of the pri~atization.’~ 
13. Again, this can be thought of as forcing agents to make their contributions to private pen- 
sion accounts but permitting them to reduce their other saving and, indeed, borrow against these 
accounts if they so desire. 
14.  These three decisions are illustrated in Chile’s privatization of social security. Chile’s priva- 
tization honored benefit commitments to existing retirees. It also provided existing workers recog- 
nition bonds-explicit  IOUs that would come due when workers reached retirement age. These 
recognition bonds compensated workers for the elimination of their claims to future social security 
benefits-claims  that they had accrued as the result of past contributions. Because the  timing of 
the payment of  principal and interest on the recognition bonds is similar to the timing of  the 
payment of the accrued social security benefits that these workers would otherwise have received, 
the Chilean reform can be viewed as paying off all accrued benefits under the old system but 
disallowing any further accrual of social security benefits. Consequently, it amounts to a particular 
benefit-phase-out policy. Chile used deficit finance to cover some of the losses in revenue arising 
from the discontinuation of the payroll tax. This deficit finance took the form of running smaller 279  Simulating the Privatization of  Social Security 
Table 7.2  Baseline Parameter Values and Spending and Tax Rates 
Parameter  Value 
Intratemporal elasticity of substitution 
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
Weight of leisure 
Pure rate of time preference 
Elasticity of substitution between labor and capital 
Population growth rate 
Output share of government consumption 
Average income tax rate 
Average marginal income tax rate 












As reported in table 7.2, the preprivatization economy features a progressive 
income tax  (with an average marginal tax rate of  33 percent) that finances 
government consumption equal to 22 percent of output, a 12 percent social 
security payroll tax, zero linkage between social security benefits and taxes, 
zero  initial  official  government  debt,  a  1 percent  population  growth  rate, 
zero technological change, a Cobb-Douglas production function, a CES utility 
function in consumption and leisure with intertemporal and intratemporal elas- 
ticities of substitution of .25 and .8, respectively, and a time preference rate of 
1.5 percent. 
Our baseline economy has a 2.5 percent rate of national saving and a ratio of 
social security outlays to output of .089.15  The pretax interest rate (the marginal 
product of capital) is 10.3 percent. At the micro level, consumption more than 
doubles between ages twenty-one and seventy-five, which is consistent with 
the findings in figure 7.2 above. Social security benefits constitute between 55 
and 60 percent of consumption for agents over sixty-five. Labor supply at age 
sixty-five is about 70 percent lower than labor supply at age twenty-one; it is 
virtually zero after age seventy-one. 
The simulation phases out social security benefits in a linear manner over a 
forty-five-year period. This phase-out period starts eleven years after the pay- 
roll tax is eliminated, thus permitting all beneficiaries at the time of the reform 
to collect all their benefits. Social security benefits during the transition are 
financed by either a proportional consumption tax, a progressive income tax, a 
The AK Model Used to Study Social Security's Privatization 
surpluses than would otherwise have been the case. Finally, Chile used its income tax to make up 
the rest of the lost payroll tax revenue and, implicitly, to  meet interest payments on its additional 
borrowing. 
15. Note that this is higher than the 1994 5.2 percent NNF'  share of  social security spending. It 
also exceeds the respective 7.5 percent for combined spending on Medicare and social security. 
This difference arises from the stylized assumption of constant 1 percent population growth. The 
current U.S. population, in contrast, reflects high birth rates in the 1950s and 1960s, and payroll 
taxes are levied on a relatively larger working population. 280  Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
payroll tax, or initial deficit financing coupled with subsequent increases in 
either proportional consumption tax rates or progressive income tax rates. For 
each case, I present results in which the welfare (utility) of initial generations 
is allowed to change in response to the privatization as well as results in which 
the welfare of initial generations is held constant. In the latter simulations, the 
LSRA redistributes in a lump sum manner so as (a)  to leave all generations 
alive at the time of  the transition  with precisely  the same utility they would 
have enjoyed absent privatization and (b)  to equalize the utility of all genera- 
tions born after the policy is initiated. Finally, I consider alternative degrees of 
benefit-tax linkage. 
7.3  Simulation Findings 
7.3.1  Simulating a Cold-Turkey Privatization 
To place subsequent privatization results in perspective, I first simulate the 
macroeconomic and efficiency effects of an immediate and complete elimina- 
tion of social security benefits and taxes. Although such a privatization is un- 
likely ever to be undertaken, simulating it clarifies the maximum damage that 
could be  done to initial older generations from privatization  as well  as the 
maximum efficiency gains available from privatization after initial older gener- 
ations are fully compensated for their loss of benefits. 
Figure 7.6 shows that this policy would have a major effect on the macro 
economy as well as the intergenerational distribution of welfare. The top panel 
in the  figure provides  an index  of the policy’s induced changes (relative  to 
initial steady-state values) in the capital stock (K),  output (Y), labor supply (L), 
the real wage (w),  and the real interest rate (r).  The first rows of tables 7.3-7.8 
(run 1) record the values graphed in the figures. 
As indicated, the “cold-turkey’’ elimination of  social security leads to a 57 
percent long-run increase in the economy’s capital stock relative to its initial 
steady-state value. The long-run increases in labor supply, output, and the real 
wage are 6, 17, and 10 percent, respectively. The long-run reduction in the real 
interest rate is 25 percent, and the long-run increase in welfare (the increase in 
utility of those alive in the long run) is 10.79 percent. This percentage change 
in  remaining  lifetime  utility  is measured  as the  percentage  increase  in  re- 
maining  lifetime consumption  and leisure at each age needed  in the  initial 
steady state to produce the same level of utility for the generation in question 
as it enjoys under privatization. 
Although figure 7.6 and the tables point to a very major long-run gain to the 
economy and its future inhabitants from a “cold-turkey’’ transition, they also 
show that these gains come at the cost of major utility losses to initial older 
generations. For example, the oldest members of society-those  born  fifty- 
four years before the reform-suffer  a 26 percent reduction in remaining life- 
time welfare. 281  Simulating the Privatization of  Social Security 
Macro Effects 
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Fig. 7.6  Progressive income tax financing of benefits, benefits eliminated 
immediately 
To investigate how much of the improvement in the welfare of future genera- 
tions  reflects  efficiency  improvements  as opposed  to  simply  redistribution 
away from initial generations, I repeated the “cold-turkey’’ simulation but in- 
structed the LSRA to compensate all initial generations to prevent any loss in 
their utility levels. The results are shown in figure 7.7 and reported as run 2 in 
the tables. The long-run increase in the capital stock in this case is lower-36 
rather than 57 percent-but  still remarkably large. It is large enough to raise 
long-run output by 14 percent, raise the long-run real wage by 6 percent, lower 
the long-run real interest rate by  16 percent, and raise the utility levels of all Table 7.3  Percentage Change in Capital Stock Relative to Steady State 
Tax Financing  Years of  Year of Transition 
SOC.  Sec.  Years Benefits  Deficit 
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Nore: LSRA  = Lump sum redistribution authority. BTL = Benefit-tax linkage. Yprog = Progressive income tax. C = Proportional consumption tax. W = Payroll tax. 
”Three  percent population growth. Table 7.4  Percentage Change in Aggregate Labor Supply Relative to Steady State 
Tax Financing  Years of  Year of Transition 
Soc. Sec.  Years Benefits  Deficit 











































































































































































































































Note:  For abbreviations, see table 7.3. 
Three percent population growth. Table 7.5  Percentage Change in Output Stock Relative to Steady State 
Year of  Transition  Tax Financing  Years of 
SOC.  Sec.  Years Benefits  Deficit 























































































































































































16.70  17.11 
12.54  13.95 
10.05  10.39 
5.96  6.44 
15.47  16.00 
10.97  12.36 
13.55  13.92 
8.09  9.58 
5 .oo  17.11 
2.3  1  8.42 
4.78  17.11 
2.10  8.11 
9.79  17.11 
7.03  10.65 
SO  13.06 
~  .68  5.84 
5.18  12.77 
3.44  7.06 
3.93  16.00 
.9  I  7.04 
1.93  13.92 
-1.71  4.08 
8.73  16.00 
5.57  9.08 
6.73  13.92 
2.88  6.13 
Nore; For abbreviations, see table 7.3. 
"Three percent population growth. Table 7.6  Percentage Change in Wage Relative to Steady State 
Tax Financing  Years of  Year of Transition 
SOC. Sec.  Years Benefits  Deficit 







































































































































-  .54 
-  .70 
-  .34 
-  .56 
1.04 






-  .99 
-  1.22 
-1.29 
-  .34 
-.56 
.03 
-  .26 
.29 
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-  .47 
-1.27 
-.31 

























































Nore: For abbreviations, see table 7.3. 
Three percent population growth. Table 7.7  Percentage Change in Interest Rate Relative to Steady State 
Tax  Financing 
SOC.  Sec.  Years Benefits 
Run  Benefits  Phased Out  LSRA  BTL 
I  YP%  0  No  0 
2  YPW  0  Yes  0 
3  Yprog"  0  No  0 
4  Yproga  0  Yes  0 
5  YPW  0  No  .I 
6  YPW  0  Yes  .1 
7  YP%  0  No  .3 
8  Yprog  0  Yes  .3 
9  Yprog  55  No  0 
10  Yprog  55  Yes  0 
11  W  55  No  0 
12  W  55  Yes  0 
13  C  55  No  0 
14  C  55  Yes  0 
15  YP%  55  No  0 
16  YPW  55  Yes  0 
17  C  55  No  0 
18  C  55  Yes  0 
19  YPW  55  No  .1 
20  YPW  55  Yes  .1 
21  YPW  55  No  .3 
22  YP%  55  Yes  .3 
23  C  55  No  .I 
24  C  55  Yes  .I 
25  C  55  No  .3 




Year of Transition 
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.62 
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-  12.30 
-  1.02 
-12.90 




-  .02 
-4.78 
-  1.55 
-2.40 
-2.56 
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-  12.60 
-4.59 
-  12.67 
-2.32 
-25.25 
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Note; For abbreviations, see table 7.3. 
'Three percent population growth. Table 7.8  Percentage Change in Remaining Lifetime Utility 
Tax  Years  Year of  Birth 
Financing  Benefits  Years of 
SOC.  Sec.  Phased  Deficit 
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Note: For abbreviations, see table 7.3 
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Fig. 7.7 
immediately, welfare of living generations constant 
Nore: K = capital stock; Y = output; W = the real wage; L = the labor supply; and 
r = the real interest rate. 
Progressive income tax financing of benefits, benefits eliminated 
those born after the reform by 7.23 percent. As excess burden calculations go, 
this is a very large efficiency gain. 
The efficiency gains are measured here as the percentage  increase in full 
lifetime income (the present value of expenditures on consumption  and lei- 
sure). Since every generation  born  after the reform  begins enjoys this  effi- 
ciency  gain,  it  represents  an ongoing flow  to the  economy.  This flow can 
readily be expressed as a percentage of initial GDP by simply multiplying the 
reported efficiency gain by  the ratio of the steady-state present value of full 
income to GDP. The latter turns out to be .53 for all runs except the high- 
growth economy. In other words, the welfare gains expressed as a percentage 289  Simulating the Privatization of  Social Security 
of GDP are about half as large as the welfare gains expressed as a percentage 
of discounted lifetime full income. 
To check the sensitivity  of  the results to the assumed growth rate, I next 
repeated (in runs 3 and 4) both simulations assuming a 3 percent population 
growth rate. The payroll tax is held constant in this analysis.  Consequently, 
the  replacement rate is twice as high as with  1 percent  population  growth. 
Accordingly, income and consumption levels are much smaller in the initial 
steady state. “Cold turkey” privatization of social security without LSRA leads 
to a larger percentage increase in capital stock, income, and wages than with 
1 percent population growth. The long-run welfare gain is 10.7 percent. With 
LSRA turned on, the high benefit level requires large transfers to the old, who 
would otherwise lose up to 41 percent of their lifetime utility. Therefore, the 
capital stock grows more slowly. Overall, the efficiency gain is 5.64 percent in 
the high-growth case compared to the 7.23 percent with 1 percent growth. 
Runs 5-8  let us consider the extent to which the results in runs  1 and 2 
depend on the degree of marginal benefit-tax linkage in the initial social secu- 
rity system. Runs 5 and 6 consider 10 percent marginal linkage, whereas runs 
7 and 8 consider 30 percent marginal linkage. Thus, in these sets of simula- 
tions, the total effective marginal tax rate on labor supply includes either 90 or 
70 percent of  the social security payroll tax rate. As a comparison of runs 5 
and 7 with run 1 indicates, macroeconomic effects of the no LSRA simulations 
are fairly similar to those without benefit-tax  linkage. For example, with 30 
percent benefit-tax linkage, there is a 52 percent long-run increase in the capi- 
tal stock compared with 57 percent with zero linkage. The LSRA runs (runs 6 
and 8) are more interesting. As shown in table 7.6, the efficiency gain from 
social security’s privatization is 6.32 percent with 10 percent linkage and 4.65 
percent with 30 percent linkage. These figures are smaller than the 7.23 percent 
efficiency gain found in run 2 when the economy features zero initial linkage. 
They indicate that even a small degree of benefit-tax linkage can have a sub- 
stantial effect on social security’s distortion of  labor supply. 
7.3.2  Progressive Income Tax or Wage Tax Financing of Transition Benefits 
The next simulations, shown in figures 7.8 and 7.9, consider privatizing so- 
cial security but raising progressive  income tax rates to pay for transitional 
benefits. In the uncompensated (no LSRA) transition (run 9), the long-run po- 
sition of  the economy is exactly the same as in the corresponding cold-turkey 
transition. But the economy’s short-term transition is quite different. The in- 
duced capital accumulation occurs much more slowly, and initial older genera- 
tions suffer much smaller reductions in their levels of remaining lifetime util- 
ity. In the compensated transition  (run lo), the efficiency gain is 1.65 percent 
compared with 7.23 percent in the cold-turkey run. Although this is a very big 
difference, a 1.65 percent efficiency gain is nontrivial. 
The fact that the efficiency gain is positive may, itself, be surprising. Intu- 
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Fig. 7.8  Progressive income tax financing of benefits 
Note: K = capital stock; Y = output; W = the real wage; L = the labor supply; and 
r = the real interest rate. 
during the transition temporarily adds extra distortions to the fiscal structure 
at the same time it eliminates a permanent  distortion  from payroll taxation. 
These extra distortions involve both the labor-leisure decisions and intertempo- 
ral consumption decisions. Now, one might think that a tax structure with per- 
manently low tax rates would be more efficient than one that collects, in pres- 
ent value, the same amount of revenue but does so with higher marginal tax 
rates in the short run than in the long run. This intuition follows from the fact 
that  tax  distortions  rise with the square of  the tax  rate, with the result that 
smoothing tax rates over time provides a way of mitigating deadweight loss. 
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Fig. 7.9  Progressive income tax financing of benefits, welfare of living 
generations constant 
Note:  K = capital stock; Y = output; W = the real wage; L = the labor supply; and 
r = the real interest rate. 
income tax financing of social security benefits in the short run has four addi- 
tional features that need to be considered. First, the switch equalizes the mar- 
ginal tax rates affecting labor-leisure and intertemporal consumption choices, 
so it smooths tax rates over economic choices."j Second, the capital income 
tax component of the progressive income tax has a lump sum tax element to it. 
In the short run, capital income is given, so taxing it via a higher rate of capital 
income taxation represents an implicit lump sum tax. Third, the decline over 
16. In the initial steady state, the tax rate on the labor-leisure margin exceeds that on the inter- 
temporal consumption margin because the payroll tax taxes only labor income. 292  Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
time in progressive income tax rates as social security benefits are phased out 
acts like a negative capital income tax rate, which offsets the distortion caused 
by  the capital income tax component of the progressive income tax that is fi- 
nancing government  purchases.  Fourth, if, as assumed in these simulations, 
social  security  benefits  are provided  independent  of  tax  contributions,  one 
could reduce the distortion of labor supply by linking benefits to marginal con- 
tributions. For example, one could provide a rate of return equal to the econo- 
my’s growth rate on each dollar paid to social security. This marginal benefit- 
tax linkage would lower the effective rate of  marginal payroll  taxation. Al- 
though the  current social security  privatization  simulations eliminate  social 
security  benefits over time rather than marginally linking them to contribu- 
tions, the result, in the long run, is quite similar because this needless addi- 
tional distortion is eliminated. 
Runs 11 and 12 phase out benefits in the same manner as runs 9 and 10 but 
pay for them with a payroll tax rather than a progressive income tax. As table 
7.3 shows, compared to income tax financing, payroll tax (wage tax) financing 
of transition benefits speeds up capital accumulation in the early phase of the 
transition. This reflects the greater saving disincentives associated with tempo- 
rarily high capital income taxes. 
The pattern of welfare gains and losses also differs. With income tax financ- 
ing, there are bigger welfare losses to initial elderly cohorts in the non-LSRA 
runs (runs 9 and 11) but also bigger gains to initial younger cohorts as well as 
those born shortly after the reform. Given these differences, which financing 
mechanism is more efficient? The answer, given in LSRA runs  10 and 12, is 
progressive income tax financing. There is a 1.65 percent efficiency gain with 
progressive tax financing compared with a 1.08 percent gain with payroll tax 
financing. 
7.3.3  Consumption Tax Financing of Transition Benefits 
The next two  simulations use  a proportional  consumption  tax to finance 
transitional  benefits. As figures 7.10 and 7.11 and runs  13 and  14 indicate, 
consumption tax financing produces much more favorable short-run macroeco- 
nomic effects in both the compensated and the uncompensated runs. For ex- 
ample, in the uncompensated run, the capital stock is 12 percent bigger in the 
tenth year of the reform than when the reform begins. With progressive income 
tax financing, the tenth-year  capital stock is actually  smaller, by  .6 percent. 
After twenty-five years, the capital stock is 26 percent larger in the uncompen- 
sated consumption tax transition  but only 5 percent larger in the uncompen- 
sated income tax transition. Since in both the uncompensated consumption and 
income tax runs the capital stock ultimately ends up 57 percent higher than its 
initial value, virtually all the crowding in of capital in the income tax financing 
run occurs more than a quarter century from the time the social security reform 
is initiated. 
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Fig. 7.10  Proportional consumption tax financing of benefits, progressive 
income tax finance of general revenues 
Note: K = capital stock; Y = output; W = the real wage; L = the labor supply; and 
r = the real interest rate. 
sumption tax run comes at the price of larger welfare losses to initial older 
generations. For example, the oldest generation at the time of the reform suf- 
fers a 4.7 percent welfare loss with consumption tax financing but only a -0.4 
percent loss under income tax financing. The question begged by this result, 
of course, is whether consumption tax financing is more efficient than income 
tax financing; that is, whether there is still an advantage to consumption tax 
financing once initial generations have been fully compensated for the addi- 
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The answer is a strong yes. The efficiency gain available with consumption 
tax financing is a quite substantial 4.33 percent. This is almost two-thirds of 
the maximum efficiency gain achievable from privatizing  social security and 
2.5 times the efficiency  gain available under income tax  financing! As dis- 
cussed in Chamley  (1 98 1) and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), consumption 
taxation is more efficient than income or wage taxation because it incorporates 
a lump sum tax on existing wealth. 
How much of this efficiency gain could be achieved by just financing ex- 
isting social security benefits through a consumption tax? A run that substitutes 
for the payroll tax a consumption tax and keeps benefits in place while com- 
pensating living generations gives the answer: the efficiency gain is 3.44 per- 295  Simulating the Privatization of Social Security 
cent compared to 4.33 percent if benefits are phased out over time. Note, how- 
ever, that, in the absence of compensation,  the long-run gains from simply 
switching to consumption tax financing of  social security are much smaller 
than those arising when one also phases out social security benefits over time. 
For example, the capital stock increases by only  17.5 percent, compared to 
56.7  percent when benefits are phased out. And the long-run  welfare gain is 
only 4.05 percent, compared to 10.79 percent. 
7.3.4  Sensitivity Analysis 
To what extend does the choice of parameter values influence the findings 
outlined above? Table 7.9 addresses this  question. It shows efficiency  gains 
from privatizing social security with income or consumption tax financing for 
combinations of  intratemporal  substitution elasticities ranging from 0.50 to 
1.20 and intertemporal elasticities of substitution ranging from 0.15 to 0.50. 
The qualitative results are the same for all the combinations indicted. Future 
generations’  welfare increases between 0.7 and 2.7 percent with income tax 
financing and between  3.5 and 5.1 percent  with consumption tax financing. 
Since-as  discussed before-efficiency  gains largely arise from eliminating 
the payroll tax’s distortion of labor supply decisions, the intratemporal elastic- 
ity of substitution between leisure and consumption has a larger influence on 
the magnitude of efficiency gains than does the intertemporal elasticity of sub- 
stitution. 
7.3.5 
Thus far, I have assumed no government debt in the initial steady state. To 
check whether this matters, I repeated runs 9 and 10 as well as 13  and 14 with 
The Importance of the Initial Debt Position 
Table 7.9  Sensitivity Analysis 
Intertemporal Elasticity 
Intratemporal  of Substitution 
Elasticity of 
Substitution  .I5  .25  .50 
Efficiency Gains with Income- 
Tax Finance (%) 
SO  Not converged  .65  1.08 
.so  1.65  1.67  1.96 
1.20  2.46  2.44  2.70 
Efficiency Gains with 
Consumption-Tax Finance (%) 
.50  Not converged  3.67  3.53 
.80  4.78  4.33  4.22 
I .20  5.05  4.75  4.72 296  Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
an initial 50 percent debt-to-GDP ratio. Recall that runs 9 and 10 incorporate 
progressive income tax financing of  social security benefits, whereas runs  13 
and 14 incorporate consumption tax financing. Runs 9 and 13 are non-LSRA, 
and runs 10 and  14 are LSRA. In all cases, the welfare gains are larger with 
initial debt than without. Welfare increases by  11.5 percent compared to 10.8 
percent in runs 9 and 13. Efficiency gains from privatization are 1.91 percent 
in the income tax financing case and 4.72 in the consumption tax financing 
case, an increase of.  15 and .29 percentage points, respectively. 
The reason for these differences in straightforward. During the transition, 
capital accumulation reduces interest rates, which also reduces the fiscal bur- 
den of debt service. This permits a reduction in tax rates. This, again, induces 
more capital accumulation and labor supply. In fact, repeating run 9 with initial 
debt leads to a 61.7 percent higher long-run capital stock and a 7.21 percent 
higher long-run labor supply. The concomitant numbers without debt are 56.7 
and 6.28 percent, respectively. Similar results apply to the other runs. Thus, 
the calculations presented so far can be understood as lower bounds for an 
economy with initial debt. 
7.3.6  Using Debt Financing in the Short Run 
An  alternative  to immediately  raising  either income  or  consumption  tax 
rates to pay for transition  benefits is to borrow  for a while. The next set of 
simulations considers a postreform period of borrowing that lasts for five years. 
Figures 7.12 and 7.13 and runs 15 and 16 consider raising progressive income 
tax rates after the five-year issuance of debt to pay both interest on the accumu- 
lated debt and social security benefits during the remainder of the transition. 
Figures 7.14 and 7.15 and runs 17 and 18 repeat this analysis but use a propor- 
tional consumption tax to pay for social security benefits  after the five-year 
period of deficit financing is completed. 
Consider first the uncompensated runs. With income tax financing, capital 
is first crowded in, then crowded out, then crowded in. As discussed in Auer- 
bach and Kotlikoff (1987), short-run crowding in can arise in the presence of 
deficit financing as workers take advantage of  temporarily low marginal tax 
rates to increase their labor supply. This leads them to both earn and save more. 
Once income taxes are raised (indeed, raised above their initial values) to pay 
interest on past accumulated debt as well as to pay for ongoing spending, work- 
ers reduce their labor supply below their initial values. In run 17, the crowding- 
idcrowding-outfcrowding-in effects of deficit financing alter the basic short- 
run pattern of capital accumulation observed in no-deficit, income tax financ- 
ing (run 9). The deficit financing also reduces the amount of long-run crowding 
in of capital, with the long-run capital stock now only 40 percent, rather than 
57 percent, larger than in the initial steady state. 
In contrast to the income tax cum temporary deficit results, the consumption 
tax cum temporary deficit displays smaller crowding in in the very short run. 
The principal reason is that the prospect of  a near-term (after year 5)  increase 297  Simulating the Privatization of  Social Security 
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Fig. 7.12  Progressive income tax financing of benefits, 5 year debt finance 
Nore: K = capital stock; Y = output; W = the real wage; L = the labor supply; and 
r = the real interest rate. 
in consumption tax rates acts just like a temporarily high rate of capital income 
taxation, leading households to substitute current for future consumption. The 
smaller short-run crowding in under consumption tax financing necessitates 
more debt accumulation in the consumption tax run than in the income tax run. 
This higher debt-to-output ratio explains why long-run capital formation is 
slightly smaller under consumption tax financing than income tax financing. 
The use of short-term deficit financing during the transition leaves the econ- 
omy with permanently higher marginal tax rates. It also particularly distorts 
the choices of how much to work and how much to save right before and right 
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runs produce smaller efficiency gains from privatization with deficit financing 
than without it. In the income tax runs, the efficiency gain is 1.27 percent with 
deficit financing, compared to  1.65 percent without. In the consumption tax 
runs, the efficiency gain is 2.98 percent with deficit financing, compared to 
4.33 percent without it. 
7.3.7  Privatizing from a Position of Partial Benefit-Tax Linkage 
The remaining eight sets of  simulations, runs 19-26,  also phase out social 
security benefits over a fifty-five-year period but do so assuming either 10 or 299  Simulating the Privatization of Social Security 
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income tax finance of general revenues, 5 year debt finance 
Note: K = capital stock; Y = output; W = the real wage; L = the labor supply; and 
r = the real interest rate. 
30 percent marginal benefit-tax linkage. As tables 7.3-7.8  indicate, the crowd- 
ing in associated with privatization is smaller the higher the degree of benefit- 
tax linkage. For example, with 30 percent linkage, the long-run increase in 
capital in the no-LSRA income and consumption tax runs is 52 percent, com- 
pared with 57 percent with no linkage. These differences and those of other 
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income tax finance of general revenues, 5 year debt finance, welfare of living 
generations constant 
Note: K = capital stock; Y = output; W = the real wage; L = the labor supply; and 
r = the real interest rate. 
without partial linkage are substantial. Run 20 in table 7.8 indicates only a 
0.66 percent gain under income tax financing when linkage is 10  percent com- 
pared to a  1.65 percent gain with zero linkage. And run 22, which features 
income tax financing with 30 percent linkage, actually shows a 1.22 percent 
efficiency loss. In the case of consumption tax financing, the efficiency gain is 
4.33 percent with zero linkage, 3.4 percent with 10 percent linkage, and 1.64 
percent  with 30 percent  linkage. These efficiency gains are 61, 55, and 37 
percent, respectively, of the corresponding maximum efficiency gains reported 301  Simulating the Privatization of Social Security 
in runs 2, 6, and 8 of table 7.6 from replacing social security with lump sum 
net taxes. 
7.4  Incorporating Intracohort Heterogeneity 
The multi-income version of  the AK model developed by  Kent Smetters, 
Jan Walliser, and me follows Fullerton and Rogers (1993) in positing twelve 
earnings classes within each cohort. Each of these earnings classes experiences 
the same longitudinal age-earnings profile as described in Auerbach and Kotli- 
koff (1987), but each has its own wage level. Thus, the classes can be thought 
of as differing in their endowments of human capital. Following Fullerton and 
Rogers (1993), the bottom decile of wage earners is divided into classes 1 and 
2. Class 1 contains 2 percent of the distribution, and class 2 contains 8 percent 
of  the distribution. Classes 3-10  contain  10 percent each of the distribution, 
and classes  11 and  12 contain the highest decile, with class 12 containing 2 
percent of the distribution and class 1  I  containing 8 percent. The initial steady- 
state wage rates for the twelve classes are also taken from Fullerton and Rogers 
(1993) andare 1, 1.7,2.2, 2.7, 3.1, 3.5,3.8,4.2,4.7,5.5,7.2,  and 10.2,respec- 
tively. 
Tables 7.10-7.15  use the multi-income model to consider two alternative 
privatization policies. One uses a consumption tax to finance transition bene- 
fits, the other a progressive income tax. Both simulations are uncompensated. 
Table 7.10  Percentage Change in Capital Stock Relative to Steady State with Multiple 
Income Classes 
TaX  Years  Year of Transition 
Financing  Benefits  Years of 
SOC.  Sec.  Phased  Deficit 
Run  Benefits  Out  LSRA  BTL  Financing  5  10  25  150 
27  C  55  No  0  0  5.75  11.85  26.06  55.64 
28  YP%  55  No  0  0  -.50  -.56  5.09  55.64 
Note: For abbreviations, see table 7.3. 
Table 7.11  Percentage Change in Labor Supply Relative to Steady State with Multiple 
Income Classes 
Tax  Years  Year of Transition 
Financing  Benefits  Years of 
SOC.  Sec.  Phased  Deficit 
Run  Benefits  Out  LSRA  BTL  Financing  5  10  25  150 
21  C  55  No  0  0  5.64  4.86  5.34  6.55 
28  YPrOs  55  No  0  0  1.82  1.84  5.49  6.55 
Nore: For abbreviations. see table 7.3 Table 7.12  Percentage Change in Output Relative to Steady State with Multiple 
Income Classes 
Tax  Years  Year of Transition 
Financing  Benefits  Years of 
SOC.  Sec.  Phased  Deficit 
Run  Benefits  Out  LSRA  BTL  Financing  5  10  25  150 
27  C  55  No  0  0  5.67  6.57  10.17  17.14 
28  YPW  55  No  0  0  1.23  1.24  5.39  17.14 
Note: For abbreviations, see table 7.3. 
Table 7.13  Percentage Change in Wages Relative to Steady State with Multiple 
Income Classes 
Tax  Years  Year of Transition 
Financing  Benefits  Years of 
SOC.  Sec.  Phased  Deficit 
Run  Benefits  Out  LSRA  BTL  Financing  5  10  25  150 
27  C  0  No  0  0  .03  1.63  4.59  9.93 
28  YPW  55  No  0  0  -.57  -.60  -.09  9.93 
Nore: For abbreviations, see table 7.3. 
Table 7.14  Percentage Change in Interest Rates Relative to Steady State with Multiple 
Income Classes 
TaX  Years  Year of  Transition 
Financing  Benefits  Years of 
SOC.  Sec.  Phased  Deficit 
Run  Benefits  Out  LSRA  BTL  Financing  5  10  25  150 
27  C  55  No  0  0  -.08  -4.72  -12.60  -24.73 
28  Yprog  55  No  0  0  1.73  1.81  1.00  -24.73 
Note: For abbreviations, see table 7.3. 
Table 7.15  Percentage Change in Remaining Lifetime Utilities for Selected 
Income Classes 
Year of  Birth 
Run and Class  -54  -  25  -  10  0  10  25  150 
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2.91  4.29  6.78  10.13 
2.81  4.03  6.27  9.22 
2.83  3.97  6.08  8.82 
2.87  3.96  6.00  8.59 
3.10  4.03  5.89  8.12 
1.32  2.29  5.08  10.13 
1.18  2.10  4.70  9.22 
1.13  2.04  4.57  8.82 
1.11  2.02  4.53  8.59 
1.10  2.04  4.52  8.12 303  Simulating the Privatization of  Social Security 
The corresponding one-income-class runs with which to compare these results 
are listed in tables 7.3-7.8  as runs 13  and 9. (Table 7.16 shows the share of tax 
revenue paid by the different income classes, and table 7.17 shows the percent- 
age changes in labor supply and consumption.) 
Such comparisons indicate that changes in macroeconomic variables in the 
multi-income-class  model  are very  close  to those  in  the one-income-class 
model. Take, for example, year 5 and year  150 increases in the capital stock 
under consumption  tax financing. They are 5.75 and 55.64 percent,  respec- 
tively, in the multi-income-class run and 5.54 and 56.67 percent, respectively, 
in the one-income-class model. Or consider the year 5 and year 150 increases 
in output in the progressive tax run. They are 1.23 and 17.14 percent, respec- 
tively, in the multi-income-class run and 1.10 and 17.11 percent, respectively, 
in the one-income-class  model. Intracohort earnings heterogeneity  does not, 
then, alter this paper’s central finding that privatizing social security can pro- 
duce very major long-run improvements in the state of the economy. 
Table 7.15 indicates that the welfare gains and losses associated with un- 
compensated transitions to privatized social security can differ significantly 
across members of a cohort and that these differences can flip signs over time. 
Take run 27, which incorporates  consumption tax financing. In this run, all 
members of the oldest cohort at the time of the reform, those age fifty-four, 
end up worse off. But the poorer elderly suffer a relatively larger welfare loss. 
For example, class 1 fifty-four-year-olds suffer a 4.58 percent reduction in re- 
Table 7.16  Share of Tax Revenues by Class in Steady States (%) 
12  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
.48  3.33  5.54  6.77  7.91  8.88  9.65  10.77  12.17  14.33  14.95  5.22 
.40  2.94  5.05  6.32  7.52  8.57  9.42  10.67  12.27  14.80  16.08  5.96 
Table 7.17  Percentage Change in Labor Supply and Consumption 
Class 
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maining lifetime utility, whereas the class 12 fifty-four-year-olds experience 
only a 3.67 percent utility loss. 
These differences reflect two factors. First, the reform induces a significant 
and immediate increase in labor supply (see table 7.1  l),  which raises the year 
1 interest rate from 9.4 to 9.8 percent. This benefits the rich elderly more than 
the poor elderly because a bigger share of  their old age consumption is fi- 
nanced by  their assets (as opposed to their social security benefits). Second, 
the increase in labor supply means more income, which means a larger income 
tax base. This permits the government to cut its income tax rates, which is 
relatively more important to the rich elderly, who start out in quite high mar- 
ginal tax brackets. 
Interestingly, the distribution of long-run utility gains in run 27 is quite dif- 
ferent from the distribution of the short-run gains. As table 7.15 points out, all 
income groups benefit in the long run, but the welfare gains to poorer income 
groups exceed those to richer ones. For example, members of the class 1  cohort 
alive in the long run enjoy a 10.13 percent increase in lifetime utility, compared 
to an 8.12 percent increase for members of the class 12 cohort alive in the long 
run. What explains this? The answer is that, for lower income classes, social 
security’s implicit tax associated with its pay-as-you-go financing represents a 
larger share of its lifetime resources than it does for the higher income classes. 
Hence,  eliminating  pay-as-you-go  social  security  provides  lower  income 
classes with a larger percentage welfare gain than it provides higher income 
classes. 
Comparing the top and bottom halves of  table 7.15 shows that the short- 
run distribution of  welfare gains from privatizing social security is critically 
dependent on the method used to finance the transition. The bottom half of the 
table, run 28, considers progressive income tax financing of transition benefits. 
Since this is disadvantageous to the richer agents as well as less efficient over- 
all compared to consumption tax financing, it is not surprising that initial el- 
derly and young members of  income class 12 are worse off in this run com- 
pared to run 27. It is also not surprising that, for example, the richest fifty-four- 
year-olds suffer a bigger welfare loss than do the poorest fifty-four-year-olds. 
7.5  Conclusion 
The privatizing of social security is spreading from South America. It could 
well spread to the United States as politicians grapple with ways of addressing 
the fiscaYdemographic  debacle facing the country. This paper’s simulations of 
the AK model show that privatizing social security is likely to generate major 
long-run increases in output and living standards. But, unless privatization in- 
cludes compensation to initial generations, these long-run gains will come, in 
large part, at their expense. This said, the pure efficiency gains from privatiza- 
tion can be substantial. Their precise size depends on the existing tax structure, 
the linkage between benefits and taxes under the existing social security sys- 305  Simulating the Privatization of Social Security 
tem, and the choice of the tax instrument used to finance benefits during the 
transition. When the initial tax  structure features a progressive  income  tax, 
when benefit-tax linkage is low, when consumption taxation is used to finance 
social security  benefits during the transition, and when  existing generations 
are fully compensated for their privatization losses, there is a 4.3 percent wel- 
fare gain to future generations. But, if  these circumstances do not hold, the 
efficiency gains from privatization are likely to be smaller, possibly even nega- 
tive. Indeed, with income tax financing of transitional benefits, 30 percent link- 
age, and full compensation paid to initial generations, future generations suffer 
a 1.2 percent welfare decline. 
There are two lessons to be drawn from this multi-income-class analysis. 
First, policies that equalize the intracohort distribution of utility in the long run 
may fail to do so in the short run. Second, in the long run, since the privatiza- 
tion of  social security eliminates an implicit tax that places a relatively high 
proportional burden on the lifetime poor, it is likely to improve the well-being 
of the lifetime poor relative to the lifetime rich; that is, as a long-run proposi- 
tion, privatizing social security is progressive. 
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Comment  Thomas J. Sargent 
The U.S. social security system was conceived during the 1930s, when many 
academic economists believed that excessive saving and overaccumulation of 
capital were fundamental macroeconomic problems. Because it depressed the 
prospective returns to new physical investments, a large capital stock promoted 
unemployment. This was the stagnation thesis. An unfunded social retirement 
system could “cure” the problem of capital overaccumulation by diminishing 
incentives to save: taxes from young workers were to be transferred to retirees. 
The promise that they too should expect to receive transfers when they were 
old would dissuade the  young from saving. This cure for too much capital 
was later formalized by the analysis of Paul Samuelson’s (1956) overlapping 
generations model (see, e.g., Diamond  1996; and Gale 1973). In that model, 
capital overaccumulation threatens when the rate of return on capital falls short 
of the rate of growth of the labor force. Low rates of return on bonds prevailed 
in the United States during the 1930s. 
With the passage of  years,  concerns  about capital  overaccumulation and 
stagnation have receded into memory, to be replaced by public concern over a 
low U.S. saving rate. But we continue to live with a social retirement system 
that was designed to arrest  saving. This dissonance is the origin of  calls to 
reform the social retirement system to make it match what are now thought to 
be the economic rewards to national saving, not those feared in the 1930s. 
The political difficulties of reforming social security are inherited from the 
economic transition  dynamics  associated first with  installing, then  with  re- 
forming, an unfunded social retirement system. Installing the system ab now 
is easier because many of those who might be harmed by the proposal cannot 
vote. A brand new system helps early retirees at the expense of future genera- 
tions, who cannot vote until much later, after the system is already in place. 
Reforming an ongoing system is more difficult because the beneficiaries of the 
old system do vote. This makes  it necessary  somehow not to undo the old 
Thomas J. Sargent is a professor at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University. 307  Simulating the Privatization of Social Security 
system too rapidly and to honor the government’s promises to retirees who live 
through  the transition. It seems easier to vote an unfunded social retirement 
system in than to vote one out. 
Laurence Kotlikoff is the coauthor of the Auerbach-Kotlikoff (I  987) model 
(the AK model), our most important practical tool for quantitatively studying 
alternative  proposals to reform  social retirement  arrangements. The present 
paper by Kotlikoff consists of two broad parts, each of which is informed by 
Kotlikoff‘s work with the AK model. The first is a wide-ranging informal dis- 
cussion of a host of financing and incentive issues. The second part is a battery 
of numerical simulations of a calibrated version of the AK model. These simu- 
lations add weight to the opinions Kotlikoff expresses in the first, less formal 
section. 
The Model 
The AK model is the correct tool for this job. It consists of overlapping 
generations of long-lived people. The equilibrium is competitive, with an ex- 
ogenous government policy. A government policy is a specification of rules for 
setting tax rates and  transfers and  for managing  the government’s debt. An 
equilibrium is a price system, a consumption allocation (to each person of each 
cohort at each age), and a government policy at which households are optimiz- 
ing and the government is satisfying its sequence of budget constraints. There 
is no uncertainty in the environment and therefore no demand for insurance. 
Thus, for Kotlikoff, an equilibrium is a collection of  sequences of real num- 
bers. Were there uncertainty facing households, an equilibrium would be a se- 
quence of probability distributions of wealth and consumption. 
Kotlikoff at first assumes a single type within each cohort and then, in order 
to study within-cohort distribution effects, a version in which there are twelve 
earning classes within each cohort. A good feature of the model is that Kotli- 
koff‘s specification of a household‘s preferences induces endogenous work re- 
ductions at the end of life (i.e., retirements). 
The AK model is a machine for studying how tax and transfer policies affect 
distributions  of  consumption  and  welfare  when  households  are free  to re- 
arrange their own affairs in reaction to government policies. A general equilib- 
rium imposes two kinds of discipline. First, the government must respect its 
budget constraint-deficit  financing limits the government’s opportunities in 
the future. Second, households respond purposefully, not arbitrarily, to govern- 
ment policies. 
Issues 
Kotlikoff  analyses alternative tax and transfer policies that can eventually 
lead to a fully funded system. Many policies can do the job. Kotlikoff’s paper 
compares a number of them with an eye toward their political  sustainability. 
Attaining political sustainability requires transferring enough of the long-term 
gains from posterity to those entitled under the initial unfunded systems. When 
the eventual gains from full funding are large enough-as  they are with Kotli- 308  Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
koff's parameter settings-there  is plenty of room to redistribute some of the 
gains toward these entitled people. 
Kotlikoff's  paper  contains  a  valuable  discussion  of  benefit-tax  linkages. 
Whether  the social security  tax  acts entirely  as a payroll  tax or partly  as a 
saving plan depends on workers'  perception of how their prospective receipts 
vary with their contributions. This perception interacts with their labor supply 
elasticities to influence the distortions associated with the social security pay- 
roll tax. 
Kotlikoff  also compares consequences of  alternative means of financing a 
scheme to compensate those who would be hurt by a sudden transition to a 
fully funded system. I commend his welfare analysis of the use of a consump- 
tion tax to finance the transition. His discussion well balances the efficiency 
and redistribution consequences of using a consumption tax. This work contin- 
ues Auerbach and Kotlikoff's focus on the intergenerational redistributional 
consequences of  moving, say, from a tax on capital to a consumption tax. 
Extensions 
Kotlikoff's formal model excludes aspects that his informal discussion men- 
tions, the social insurance provided by  the social security  system. How and 
whether this exclusion  affects the case for fully funding  social security de- 
pends  on how  one models markets for insurance. Settings with incomplete 
markets  augment forces for capital accumulation and make more room for 
using a tax-transfer mechanism to correct the problem. In addition, with in- 
complete markets, uncertainty activates mechanisms that cause aggregate ran- 
domness to affect income distributions. 
It is possible and natural to extend the basic AK model to uncertain environ- 
ments with incomplete markets. The cheapest extension covers settings with 
no aggregate uncertainty but uninsurable uncertainty at the individual level, 
which averages out in the aggregate. In recent work, two sorts of individual 
uncertainty have been included: life-span risk and household-specific  endow- 
ment or labor-income risk (see Imrohoroglu, Imrohoroglu, and Joines  1995). 
Even with one type of  household ex ante, market incompleteness causes the 
distribution of consumption across individuals within a cohort to spread. Dea- 
ton and Paxson (1994) discuss the fanning-out mechanism, an implication of 
the permanent income theory with incomplete markets. An equilibrium of such 
a model induces a probability  distribution of consumption across households 
for each cohort for each time period. Figures 7C. 1 and 7C.2 display the mean 
and standard deviation of consumption distributions for such a model, during 
a funding experiment similar to one of Kotlikoff's (these figures are taken from 
Huang, Imrohoroglu, and Sargent [  19961). The experiment is a transition from 
an unfunded to a fully funded retirement system in which the initially entitled 
people are fully compensated. The compensation to the old-which  is over 
2.5 times GDP-is  financed by issuing bonds, then raising the tax rate on labor 
income until the extra bonds are retired. Notice how this transition eventually date born  time 
Fig. 7C.1 
experiment 1  of Huang, Imrohoroglu, and Sargent (1996), a bond-compensated, 
tax-financed removal of social security. The shadow on the floor depicts when a 
cohort is alive. 
Mean consumption profiles for all cohorts during a transition for 
0 
date born  time 
Fig. 7C.2  Standard deviations of consumption for all cohorts during the 
transition for experiment 1 of Huang, Imrohoroglu, and Sargent (1996). 310  Laurence J. Kotlikoff 
raises both the mean and the standard deviation of the age-consumption pro- 
files. The point of these pictures is to extend the analysis of Kotlikoff's section 
7.4. Government policy affects not only the mean but also the standard devia- 
tion of these distributions. The details of the transition financing scheme affect 
how much the distribution of  consumption across households will spread or 
compress in response to the reform. This point reinforces Auerbach and Kotli- 
koff's long-standing emphasis on the distributional consequences of alternative 
fiscal policies. It warns us not to oversell the benefits of a transition: not every- 
one is likely to be a winner. The current system provides some social insurance 
that is not likely to be fully replaced. 
More challenging aspects of uncertainty to include are aggregate risk about 
two features of the environment: returns on capital and demography. These are 
technically difficult to incorporate because they cause the aggregate state for 
the economy to include distributions of  wealth  across people, a feature that 
makes the dimension of the state unmanageably large. Progress is being made 
with studying such models (see Krusell and Smith 1995), and it is important 
to bring that progress to bear on AK types of models. Our estimates about the 
benefits  of  funded versus  unfunded  social security  and retirement  arrange- 
ments will hinge on our calibrations of the riskiness of returns to capital and 
demography. 
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Discussion summary  Jeffrey Liebman and Andrew Samwick 
The first comments of the general discussion focused on some of the simplifi- 
cations used in the model used to simulate privatization.  Some caution was 311  Simulating the Privatization of  Social Security 
suggested in allowing for the labor supply response to an improved benefit-tax 
linkage because not all people behave according to the model presented in this 
paper. In particular, some people might be myopic or simply have  high dis- 
count rates and face liquidity constraints. The private returns or welfare gains 
to these people may be very low. Another participant responded that, since the 
gains came in the form of lower taxes, discounting was not a main concern for 
evaluating this proposal. The author added that the reduction in payroll taxes 
might help ease the liquidity constraints on the young workers. Another simpli- 
fication that was brought to light is that, in a model with income uncertainty, 
the social security system provides insurance to the extent that it is progressive. 
Because the author’s model eliminates the current system completely, it loses 
the benefit of this insurance. When evaluating the author’s model without un- 
certainty, the paper’s focus on achieving “no distortion” would no longer be 
appropriate, as the concerns of insurance and redistribution would have to be 
balanced against efficiency. 
The discussion then turned to the role of  the consumption tax in the pro- 
posed privatization. In particular, given the heavy reliance on the consumption 
tax for the efficiency gains, the question was raised as to the extent to which 
this proposal should be considered a privatization rather than simply a change 
in fiscal policy. In this model, the privatization of social security is simply the 
elimination of the payroll tax. Because the payroll tax and the consumption tax 
have identical steady states, the efficiency gains arise from the substitution of 
the latter for the former in a way that taxes the current elderly disproportion- 
ately. One participant noted that the author’s claim that implementing a retail 
sales tax would increase the burden on the elderly owing to higher prices was 
not necessarily true. If  the Fed used monetary policy to keep the price level 
constant, then more of the burden would be borne by working generations in 
the form of lower real earnings. The author later responded that the basic prop- 
osition here is to make current generations better off by raising the burden on 
the elderly and that all privatizations are essentially just alternative ways  of 
financing retirement obligations. 
The author concluded the discussion by addressing two of the improvements 
to the overall setup of the simulation model that he has been working on. The 
first is the more realistic modeling of the demographic changes that will arise 
as the population ages. These demographics have been included in the original 
Auerbach-Kotlikoff  model  and  could  be  incorporated in  the  privatization 
model as well. The second is to allow for at least some forms of heterogeneity 
within each age cohort. In particular, there are preliminary versions of  the 
model that have twelve different income brackets, the results of which are that 
low-income workers can be taxed less because high-income workers choose to 
work more and therefore pay more taxes. 